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This paper analyses the proceedings brought against Augusto Pinochet. After a description of the case 
which took place on a truly transnational level, involving jurists, politicians and human rights groups 
across two continents, the paper will look at the impact on political life in Chile, arguing that 
transnational justice was important in not only seriously discrediting the ex-military leader’s figure, but 
also in propelling a new political climate where new actors, in particular victims and judges, were given a 
greater prominence in the process of transnational justice. This sense of empowerment has had an impact 
at a global level, with victims elsewhere seeking to bring perpetrators of human rights violations 
accountable in foreign courts. The paper concludes that despite the success of the Pinochet proceedings in 
giving human rights a greater platform in Chile, the possibilities of universal jurisdiction becoming a 
widespread tool for victims around the globe are limited, now that important limitations have been placed 
on nondomestic cases by national lawmakers. 
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Questo articolo analizza il procedimento contro Augusto Pinochet. Dopo una descrizione iniziale del 
procedimento svoltasi a livello genuinamente transnazionale, coinvolgendo giuristi, politici e gruppi per i 
diritti umani in due continenti, lʹ′articolo esamina l'impatto sulla vita politica in Cile, sostenendo che la 
giustizia transnazionale è stata importante non solo per screditare la figura del ex militare, ma anche per 
spingere verso un nuovo clima politico in cui le vittime del regime militare, hanno avuto un maggiore 
ruolo nel processo della giustizia transnazionale. Questo senso di empowerment ha avuto un impatto a 
livello globale, con le vittime sparse in diverse parti del mondo che hanno potuto accusare chi ha violato i 
diritti umani i tribunali fuori dal Cile. Lʹ′articolo conclude che, nonostante questi importanti risultati, le 
possibilità di giurisdizione universale stanno diventando uno strumento molto diffuso cui possono far 
ricorso le vittime di crimini contro lʹ′umanità in tutto il mondo, anche se importanti limitazioni sono state 
introdotte dai legislatori nazionali.  
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Introduction	  
A study of the emergence of an international criminal justice system would be impossible 
without the analysis of the case of Augusto Pinochet. Once more General Pinochet grabbed the 
world’s attention on 16 October 1998, this time not as the author of a bloody coup but due to his 
unexpected arrest in a London clinic. The Chilean military figure ceased to be the director of 
operations, and instead became a bystander who for 503 days awaited his fate at the hands of 
Spain and the United Kingdom’s courts and senior politicians. During this lengthy time-span, 
politics and law became closely intertwined in an outcome that would have serious implications 
not only for human rights in Chile, but at a global level for the prosecution of former heads of 
states. Rarely is the trial of the former dictator described without the epithets “landmark” or 
“transcendental,” and one commentator described it as a “jurisprudential bombshell” (Falk 
2009) given that never before had a former head of state had been arrested abroad under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction.  
The Pinochet case is key starting point for analysing what has become an important 
component of the emerging criminal justice system: trials in foreign courts under the principle 
of universal jurisdiction. When the possibilities of seeking justice for human rights crimes seem 
limited on a domestic level, due to an amnesty or as a result of the reluctance of judges to 
prosecute (or both in the case of Chile), then foreign courts may provide an alternative arena for 
trials. 
Proceedings in Europe forced jurists in both Spain and the United Kingdom, as well as in 
several other European countries, to confront head on unchartered questions of international 
criminal law; amongst these, the potential of foreign courts as a forum for trying perpetrators of 
heinous crimes committed thousands of kilometres away, the limitations to the impunity granted 
to a former head of state, and the scope of interpretation of universal jurisdiction in domestic 
courts. The decision made by Spain’s National Audience (Audiencia Nacional) and the final 
ruling of the House of Lords, in which six of the seven Law Lords decided against granting 
Pinochet immunity, made it clear that former dictators could no longer expect an automatic 
safety blanket against human right violations, at least not when they left the confines of their 
own countries. Rather than simply being a principle enshrined on paper in international 
conventions, the principle of individual accountability for the worst human rights violations 
began to take on practical significance.  
But whilst an important advancement, the Pinochet case raised serious questions regarding 
universal jurisdiction, first and foremost the right of foreign courts to meddle in another state’s 
delicate process of transnational justice. There was outrage at the decision of the British 
authorities to arrest General Pinochet, considered a gross violation of state sovereignty by many. 
The reaction of the Chilean president at the time, Edward Frei, on hearing of Pinochet’s arrest, 
was to ask why, if the Spanish judges were so keen to prosecute heinous crimes abroad, they 
had not done the same in relation to violations committed during the country’s own civil war 
between 1936 and 1939? (Roht-Arriaza 2005) It seemed as though double standards were being 
applied with one law for national crimes and another for extraterritorial crimes. Likewise, Henry 
Kissinger, wrote an article “The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction”, in which he criticised the 
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precedent for threatening to undermine the country’s path to reconciliation. He argued that “the 
instinct to punish must be related, as in every constitutional democratic political structure, to a 
system of checks and balances that includes other elements critical to the survival and 
expansion of democracy” (Kissinger 2001). 
The Pinochet case therefore raises important questions about whether foreign courts can and 
should administrate justice over human rights crimes which dig deep into national sensibilities 
and question collective memory. Were the fears expressed by Henry Kissinger really founded in 
the case of Pinochet? Are these transnational trials damaging to the reconciliation of a nation 
after a particularly fraught chapter of internal violence? Or, on the contrary, can foreign courts 
act as a catalyst for domestic justice?  
This paper, after a description of the proceedings itself, will focus on the political 
ramifications of the Pinochet case, considering the effect of proceedings abroad in reopening 
discussion about past events at home. As this paper will discuss, the Pinochet case had a 
significant impact in propelling a new political climate in Chile. With General Pinochet’s 
absence form the country, his grip over politics loosened and made way for a new stance 
towards human rights. New state and non-state actors were empowered; victims, human rights 
groups and judges all began to play a much more transcendental role in advocating a new 
approach to transitional justice. However, the long-term term possibilities of challenging 
impunity through universal jurisdiction are more uncertain, however, as national legislators 
have sought to curtail the scope of extraterritorial laws. 
 
Part	  I.	  Testing	  the	  Limits	  of	  Universal	  Jurisdiction	  
A	  brief	  background	  	  
The story behind Augusto Pinochet Uguarte’s rise to power is well known. The news of the 
coup d’état that deposed Chile’s first democratically elected socialist leader Salvador Allende 
on 11 September 1973 and resulted in his subsequent death at the presidential palace of La 
Moneda palace stunned the world. Congress was dissolved and a military junta was established. 
The years which followed were marked by brutal killings, torture and disappearances which 
forced General Pinochet’s opponents into silence. Whilst the number of political murders in the 
seventeen-year dictatorship is estimated at 3,065 individuals (Valech Commission 2011), the 
number of Chileans that fled into exile was far greater. Almost 200,000 Chileans were forced to 
leave the country and many settled abroad permanently.  
The worse period of human rights abuses came at the start of the military regime between 
1973 and 1977. The Chilean secret service, DINA, was established toward the end of 1973, and 
initiated an organized method of political persecution. The military government did not deny the 
violation of human rights abuses, but rather justified it on the grounds that the country was on 
the verge of a civil war. In 1978, the military junta issued a self-amnesty aimed at absolving 
security agents for the crimes committed from 1973. To this day, the amnesty, the Decree Law 
2191, remains in place, although Chilean judges have found notable ways to circumvent it. 
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General Pinochet stepped down following a 1988 referendum in which 54.7% of the 
population voted against a prolongation of his rule. But the return of democracy in 1990 did not 
mean the disappearance of Pinochet from politics; a pacted transition ensured that the military 
would be safeguarded an important standing in many aspects of public life. As part of a deal 
which he struck with the new democratic government, the former head of state continued as 
chief of the armed forced chief until 1997. He was then named a life-long senator, a position 
which under Chilean law automatically granted him impunity. Key supporters of the military 
dictatorship kept their positions in public office, including in Chilean courts.  
As in the case of other countries struggling to overcome years of dictatorship, incumbent 
President Aylwin was confronted with the key question of how best to achieve the 
reconciliation of his country whilst consolidating the transition to democracy. Chilean society 
was, and still is, a divided one and an attempt to reconstruct the country had to avoid 
exacerbating the deep polarization existent. A considerable proportion of Chileans still 
supported General Pinochet when he stepped down as shown by the fact that 43% of Chileans 
voted to keep him in power in the 1988 presidential plebiscite. Any successor therefore had to 
tread cautiously over the eggshells of the past. Argentina’s approach through the trials of the 
country’s highest military officers in the mid-1980s persuaded the Aylwin administration to 
adopt a more cautious path of reconciliation and to avoid outright persecution.1  
The National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation was established in 1990 to 
reconstruct the picture of human rights violations during the Pinochet years. It produced a 
tentative report, known as the Rettig Report, which named the regime’s victims but not those of 
the perpetrators. Chile’s strategy of reconciliation was based, therefore, during most of the 
1990s on offering victims material reparations in the form of public health, pensions and 
education grants for the damages inflicted upon them (worth fifteen million dollars a year), 
rather than through the legal channel of holding perpetrators accountable. There was a strong 
political reluctance by the post-dictatorship governments to delve any deeper, and one 
significant illustration of this tacit acceptance of the status quo is the fact that the National 
Holiday, celebrating the 1973 coup, was abolished as late as 1998.  
Neither was the judiciary branch in Chile keen to initiate domestic trials for human rights 
violators. A few prosecutions did occur in the early 1990s, but these targeted only a tiny 
minority. By 1999, only 19 former members of the military had been convicted for crimes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  On assuming the Argentine presidency in 1983, Raúl Alfonsín took decisive steps to address human 
rights violations committed under the military regime (1976-1983) including the revocation of the self-
amnesty law, the creation of a truth commission known as the National Commission on the Disappeared 
(CONADEP) which produced the Nunca Más report and the trial of the regime’s key military figures. But 
the investigations went further than anticipated, and the government began to lose control over the 
transitional justice process, with the military fomenting unrest and threatening another coup d’état. 
Finally, under intense pressure in the wake of the Carapintada uprising, Alfonsín’s government passed 
the Due Obedience law, an amnesty to block future trials, in 1987. Several years later, President Menem’s 
issued a pardon for the former military leadership. Although a number of military leaders would be 
prosecuted in the following decades, Argentina’s experience in 1980s encouraged the Concertación 
governments in Chile to exercise caution. 
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during the military dictatorship (more than 5,000 lawsuits had been filed), and almost all of 
these were low-ranking officials for crimes which were not included in the self-amnesty 
(Chinchón 2007). The possibilities of bringing Pinochet to account, therefore, seemed a long 
way off in the 1990s. 
The	  proceedings	  in	  Europe	  
In many ways, the arrest of Augusto Pinochet in London on 16 October 1998 came out of the 
blue. The proceedings were initiated as a symbolic struggle more than anything else. For years, 
a sprinkling of human rights groups and members of civil society had been actively fighting for 
the crimes under Pinochet’s military dictatorship to be recognized, but the calls were met on 
deaf ears as the government and society at large seemed intent on forgetting this chapter of 
Chile’s history. So what acted as the detonator for the Pinochet case in 1998? A handful of 
extremely determined judges and the strong backing of a transnational network of human rights 
organizations prepared to work insatiably to see Pinochet stripped of his immunity were 
amongst the main ingredients for success, but also important was a new concern at a global 
level for human right violations (Roht-Arriaza 2005). 
The principle triad of countries that were to have a bearing on Pinochet’s fate were Spain, 
the United Kingdom and Chile. The Pinochet drama unfolded initially in two main theatres, 
Spain’s National Audience and the British House of Lords, although allegations were later also 
brought against the military dictator in France, Belgium and Switzerland. So divisive was the 
Pinochet case that it had to be re-heard in three separate phases of litigation by the House of 
Lords, Britain’s highest court of appeals until 2009. 
Although diplomatic tensions surfaced, the particular political climate in these three 
countries was also important in allowing the proceedings to run their course. Both the British 
and Spanish governments were caught in a catch-22 situation, between the obligation to uphold 
the nations’ commitment to human rights and international conventions on the one-hand, and 
damaging relations with a strong economic and at one time strategic power, Chile, on the other. 
The United Kingdom especially had important arms deals with Chile, which could have been 
jeopardized by an escalation of a diplomatic conflict. But in reality, the fact that all three of the 
governments at the centre of the Pinochet proceedings were fairly centrist and committed to 
upholding a due process of justice allowed the proceedings to continue. In Spain, the right-wing 
People’s Party (PP) had recently been elected into government under the leadership of José 
María Aznar. Following a series of corruption scandals which saw the socialist party fall from 
grace, the new government was keen to show the complete independence of the judiciary, and 
its actions was closely scrutinized by the Spanish public and press, firmly in support of seeing 
General Pinochet stand trial. Likewise in the United Kingdom, public pressure made the Labour 
government under Tony Blair reluctant to intervene, especially given its stance on pushing 
forwards an “ethical” foreign policy. It would have been a very different story, for example, if 
Pinochet had come to Britain a decade previously as a very firm friend and ally of Margaret 
Thatcher. In fact, Thatcher paid a visit to Pinochet when he was under house arrest in the spring 
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of 1999 as a gesture of solidarity. Pinochet’s months of detention signalled a rocky patch in 
bilateral relations, but in the end, the damage was “ephemeral” (Roht-Arriaza, 2005).  
The first case of extraterritorial crimes filed in Spain in 1996 concerned victims of the 
military regime in Argentina during the 1970s. The person who headed the investigation was 
Judge Baltazar Garzón who had already made a name for himself with his involvement in 
politics and high-profiled drug trafficking cases. Victims of the Chilean dictatorship were keen 
to jump on the bandwagon of justice and an initial complaint against General Pinochet was filed 
by Joan Garcés, a lawyer with deep ties to Chile and Manuel Murillo, representing the Salvador 
Allende Foundation, along with several human rights organizations including the Chile’s 
Association of Family Members of the Disappeared. Amongst the crimes alleged, were 
genocide, terrorism, torture and illegal detention from 1973 to 1990. Initially, the Argentine and 
Chilean cases were considered separately but eventually these were assimilated into a broader 
investigation on Operation Condor, a regional plan aimed at obliterating leftist political 
opponents across Latin America in the 1970s, under Judge Garzón. 
So why were these initial complaints filed in Spain? In addition to close cultural ties and the 
fact that many political exiles had fled to Spain during the military dictatorship and had as a 
result established human rights networks across Europe, the peculiarities of the Spanish legal 
system facilitated a judicial process which in other countries may have proved impossible 
(Roht-Arriaza, 2005). A 1985 article confers on Spanish courts the jurisdiction to investigate 
and prosecute extraterritorial crimes typified as genocide and terrorism, or any crime that Spain 
is obliged to prosecute under international treaties. The victims concerned do not necessarily 
have to be Spanish nationals, thus leaving a large window for prosecuting extraterritorial human 
rights violations. Not only this, but under Spanish law ordinary civilians can file a case with a 
procedure known as acción popular without having to prove a direct connection to the victims 
or incur the costs. In the initial stages, this action does not require the support of the public 
prosecutor and only needs an investigating magistrate prepared to pursue the case. This unusual 
feature allowed Judge Garzón to move forward with the Operation Condor investigations 
despite the opposition of the public prosecutor. There was, however, one seemingly important 
obstacle under Spanish law: no trials are permitted in absentia. This meant that if any Generals 
from the Southern Cone were to stand trial, they would have to be brought to Spain.  
This explains why when news broke out that Pinochet was travelling to London for a 
medical operation, events accelerated rapidly. Faced with the possibility of Pinochet once more 
returning to the safe-heaven that Chile’s justice system granted him, Judge Garzón decided 
issue a warrant under the 1989 British Extradition Act. On the night of 16 October 1998, 
General Pinochet was arrested at the private clinic where he was receiving treatment. This 
marked the start of a long legal battle, after which Pinochet’s immunity would not be questioned 
in Europe, but also in Chile.  
The Spanish public prosecutor rapidly challenged Judge Garzón’s call for the extradition of 
General Pinochet before the National Audience. But in a ruling on 5 November 1998, the court’s 
eleven judges unanimously upheld the exercise of universal jurisdiction in Spain, specifying that 
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Spain had a legitimate interest to hear these cases since more than fifty nationals had died or 
disappeared in Chile. 
Meanwhile, Pinochet appealed Spain’s decision to issue an international arrest warrant. The 
General’s lawyers pointed out the technical problem with Garzón’s warrant; the detention of 
Pinochet was for crime of genocide, which is not an extraditable offence under British law. 
Under the rule of double criminality, extradition can only be sought when a crime is both 
prosecutable under the law of the requesting state and the state to which the fugitive has fled. 
The Spanish judge therefore issued a new warrant, this time for acts of torture and hostage 
taking. But the Divisional Court quashed this second warrant on the grounds that Pinochet, as a 
former head of state, enjoyed absolute immunity from prosecution under British jurisdiction. 
The Crown Prosecution Service, representing Spain, appealed the decision and the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords was called upon to hear the case. The cases decided by the 
Appellate Committee tended to be dealt with swiftly, but in this case, with the principle of 
universal jurisdiction at stake, the proceedings in the United Kingdom would involve three 
separate phases of litigation by the House of Lords, known as Pinochet I, Pinochet II and 
Pinochet III.  
The principal issue of Pinochet I was whether Pinochet, as a former head of state, enjoyed 
sovereign immunity from arrest and extraditions proceedings in the United Kingdom. Since 
Pinochet was still in government during the period of the alleged crimes, the Law Lords 
contemplated whether these could be considered part of his official functions as head of state, or 
whether they fell outside of the scope of his duties.  
On 25 November 1998, with a vote of three to two, the House of Lords ruled that acts of 
torture, hostage taking and crimes against humanity fell beyond the scope of official functions, 
and therefore the former head of state could not be granted immunity from extradition for these 
crimes. Although a close battle, it was a momentous moment for the notion of individual 
accountability and universal jurisdiction. Lord Nicholls’ opinion reflected the view that the 
principle of sovereignty does not shield political leaders from persecution for heinous acts:  
 
International law recognizes, of course, that the functions of a head of state may include 
activities which are wrongful, even illegal, by the law of his own state or by the laws of 
other states. But international law has made plain that certain types of conduct, including 
torture and hostage taking, are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone. This applies 
as much to heads of state, or even more so, as it does to everyone else; the contrary 
conclusion would make a mockery of international law. (R v Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistry, ex parte Pinochet Uguarte 3 W.L.R 1456 [HL 1998]) 
 
By contrast, the two judges presenting the dissenting view argued that General Pinochet was 
acting in a sovereign capacity and showed a certain scepticism towards the implementation of 
universal jurisdiction, pointing out that no consensus existed regarding its application.  
In accordance to British law, however, it was the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, who was 
obliged to have the last word and make the decision of whether General Pinochet should be 
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returned to Chile. By sending Pinochet back to Chile, he would be breaching the United 
Kingdom’s commitment to the principles of international law, but by denying such a move, he 
faced uncertain diplomatic consequences as the United States and Chile were both exerting 
strong pressure for the defendant to be returned to his home country. Despite these pressures, 
Straw maintained that legal questions rather than political matters should decide the case. 
Whilst human rights’ advocates lauded the Appellate Court’s decision, the principle of 
judiciary independence was questioned in Pinochet II. It emerged that one of the five Law Lords 
was a Director of the Amnesty International Charitable Trust, thus raising the question of his 
possible bias since Amnesty International had acted as an intervener in Pinochet I. Automatic 
disqualification had never before been the result of non-pecuniary motives, but the case was too 
important for Pinochet’s case for a fair process not to be heard. Although the impact of the 
connection on Lord Hoffman’s final decision was debatable, it was agreed that there was an 
appearance of bias and that the first order should be set aside. A new panel was set up made up 
of seven Law Lords who had not previously been party to the case.  
The third phase of litigation however, in contrast to the first, focused on much narrower, 
technical issues related to UK law rather than international customary law. On 24 March 1999, 
after several weeks of deliberation, six of the seven judges handed down their judgement 
upholding the decision to deny Pinochet immunity. But timing became crucial to the ruling. The 
court ruled that all crimes filed against General Pinochet prior to 29 September 1988- the date 
when the International Convention Against Torture was incorporated into British law- did not 
constitute extraditable crimes. In this way, severe limitations were imposed on the number of 
crimes for which General Pinochet could be extradited, adding to all those charges of terrorism 
and kidnapping which had already been discarded at an earlier date due to the rule of double 
criminality. 
Analysts of the case have pointed to the final ruling as a shrewd decision, from a political 
standpoint, in which Law Lords attempted to placate all those involved in the narrowest possible 
terms (Roht-Arriaza 2005). The Appellate Court had the delicate task of balancing legal 
questions with domestic and international pressures whilst dealing with a huge amount of public 
scrutiny. At a time of serious legal shakeup in Britain, the overturning of the decision made in 
Pinochet I several months later would have serious undermined the credibility of the British 
legal system, but at the same time, Pinochet’s close association with Margaret Thatcher meant 
that there was vehement opposition from Conservatives to the legal proceedings in the first 
place (Byers 2000). Even more importantly, the hearings were strongly opposed by the Chilean 
government itself, and the Pinochet case threatened to snowball into a full-blown diplomatic 
crisis with Chile severing ties with the British government in December 1998. Therefore, the 
final ruling, which recognized the limits of Pinochet’s impunity but in concrete terms, found 
him extraditable for just a small percentage of the initial allegations, was seemingly a practical 
compromise.  
But this was not quite the end of the story. Pinochet’s case would rest on politics rather than 
on the legal hearings. Determined to see Pinochet stand trial in a national court, the Chilean 
government finally got its way. At the end of 1999 after Pinochet’s medical condition had 
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deteriorated somewhat, Home Secretary Jack Straw allowed the Chilean former head of state to 
undergo an inspection by British doctors who declared him unfit to stand trial. Controversially, 
General Pinochet was released on humanitarian grounds at the start of March 2000. His health 
would be the subject on intense debate over the next few years, his opponents claiming that he 
had feigned illness to escape extradition and he was even awarded a symbolic Oscar for his 
performance by protesters in Santiago. In the end, General Pinochet would not be the first 
defendant to stand the test of universal jurisdiction in a European court, but neither would he 
find himself quite as sheltered from justice as he had once been.  
 
Table	   1.	   External	   developments:	   The	   Pinochet	   Proceedings	   in	   Spain	   and	   the	  United	   Kingdom	  
(1998-­‐2000)2	  
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  This timeline excludes the actions of three other States, France, Switzerland and Belgium, who also 
sought the extradition of General Pinochet in late 1998.  
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PART	  II.	  Domestic	  impact	  of	  the	  proceedings	  
A	  new	  climate	  of	  transitional	  politics	  
When Augusto Pinochet landed in Chile on 3 March 2000, amongst the first words he 
pronounced to his son Marco Antonio were “the air is different here” (El Mercurio 2001). 
Although it was an expression of his joy at having returned to the more favourable climate in his 
home country, he would soon find that the air had undergone some profound changes in the 
months he had been absent. The perception of Pinochet’s invincibility had been swept away, 
and both efforts at uncovering truth and pursuing justice went a little further than they had in the 
1990s. After suffering from years of obscurity, the victims’ claims entered the public realm for 
the first time and General Pinochet’s power and peace was shattered by a number of court cases 
which stacked up against him. As The New York Times put it, Pinochet returned to Chile as the 
“emperor with no clothes” (Krauss 2000).  
Transitional justice in Chile can be time-lined into two separate phases (Collins 2013). The 
first, between 1990 and 1998, was a static period during which justice was done, in the words of 
President Aylwin, “to the extent possible” through the national truth commission whilst 
avoiding human rights trials. It was very much a period of forgetting and moving on, of 
restorative justice with a curtain seemingly having been drawn over the past. This approach was 
influenced by the argument of transitional justice theorists who argued that human rights trials 
were a destabilizing force to the consolidation of transitional democracies (Huntington 1991). 
According to this view, prosecutions were counter-productive- and even threatening- to the re-
building of institutions and society. Likewise, there were plenty of voices within Chile who 
advised against holding the military regime accountable. In a lecture, an influential Chilean 
lawyer José Zalaquett, reflected on the political compromises which, in his view, were needed 
for a successful reconciliation with the past: 
 
Political leaders cannot afford to be moved only by their convictions, oblivious to real-life 
constraints, lest in the end the very ethical principles they wish to uphold suffer because 
of a political or military backlash. In the face of a disaster brought about by their own 
misguided actions, politicians cannot invoke as a justification that they never yielded on 
matters of conviction. That would be as haughty as it would be futile, and certainly would 
bring no comfort to the people who must live with the consequences of the politician's 
actions (Zalaquett 1992). 
 
The very real fear of another coup meant there was very little retributive justice in the 
immediate years following Pinochet’s resignation; the truth commission initiative was 
conservative, failing to address the issue of torture for the survivors of the regime and the 
amnesty was firmly entrenched, with judges seemingly reluctant to challenge it. Pinochet’s 
sway over politics was still pretty tight in these years.  
The year 1998 was therefore a turning point for the second phase of transitional justice, after 
which the feeble non-judiciary mechanisms in place were no longer deemed sufficient to 
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overcome the past. Prosecutions at a national level since Pinochet’s arrest have not been a total 
success with “a kind of rough and partial justice” being done (Roht-Arriaza 2005). Statutes of 
limitation have prevented some cases from being heard and the amnesty law continues to be a 
clear hurdle. But there is no doubt that the search for individual criminal accountability has 
gained significant momentum, and a more complete form of transitional justice combining 
retributive sentences and renewed truth endeavours, as well as symbolic measures of reparation, 
has been introduced. In this second phase too, the empowerment of civil society and judges has 
meant that the Executive branch has lost its monopoly over steering the course of justice in this 
second phase (Collins 2013). 
Pinochet’s arrest seems like the clear-cut division between two periods of transnational 
justice, but the merit for initiating this second phase of transitional cannot be solely attributed to 
external events, since significant developments were already occurring at a national level (Pion-
Berlin 2004). Changes had already been put into motion prior to the proceedings in Spain with 
substantial judicial overhaul beginning in the mid-nineties. The reforms concentrated on 
creating a new, open court system of criminal law, on creating specialized chambers to hear 
appeals on closed cases and on establishing a new relationship between civilian and military 
courts. The number of judges in the Supreme Court was expanded from 17 to 21, and there was 
a change in its composition. With eleven new judges incorporated by the end of 1998, the 
majority of Supreme Court judges had been appointed after Pinochet’s stepping down from 
power. The change in the composition of key judiciary organs meant the gradual loosening of 
loyalty to the military amongst judges which paved the way for subsequent human rights cases. 
Secondly, a lawsuit against Pinochet and a Supreme Court ruling marked significant progress 
even before the General’s arrest in London. At the start of 1998, Judge Guzmán of the Santiago 
Appeals Court began investigating the crimes committed by the “Caravan of Death”, the special 
military unit in charge of murdering political opponents in the regime’s early days. For the first 
time ever, General Pinochet’s name was linked to several of these crimes, and although he still 
enjoyed parliamentary immunity at the time, the case would eventually lead to his indictment in 
December 2000, something which for many years had proved unimaginable. In another ruling a 
month before Pinochet’s detention in London, the Chilean Supreme Court ruled in favour of re-
investigating a case, the Poblete Córdova case, which had been closed concerning a 
disappearance during the military dictatorship. As well affirming Chile’s obligations under 
international law, the ruling was crucial in providing a way to circumvent the 1978 amnesty 
laws. It considered that for the amnesty to be applied, the whereabouts of the victim had to be 
known; otherwise the “disappearance” was an on-going crime and could therefore be 
investigated. With the amnesty law still in place, this was to provide a widow for investigating 
numerous cases which had been previously set aside. 
Significant national developments cannot therefore be excluded from the picture. But the 
Pinochet hearings abroad accelerated changes in Chile by shaming the government into 
pressuring its own courts into delivering justice (Pion-Berlin 2004). The Frei administration had 
pushed for the return of General Pinochet to Chile based on the premise that he would face 
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justice domestically; now that the whole world was following the case, the old status quo of 
impunity could hardly be maintained.  
Pressure from outside was accompanied by intensified pressure from civil rights groups 
within Chile. Thousands of protesters marched in the streets of Santiago demanding that 
General Pinochet should be investigated. The proceedings abroad had the effect of empowering 
victims, granting them an important voice in the public sphere. Civil groups had played an 
important role during the dictatorship in Chile, detailing human rights abuses in the early of 
years of Pinochet’s dictatorship and acting as a key force behind the 1988 referendum. But their 
importance had faded with the transition to democracy, and they did not wield enough influence 
to guide the course of the official reconciliation strategy. With the proceedings in Europe, these 
groups, such as Association of Families of the Detained and Disappeared (AFDD) and the 
Association of Families of Executed Political Activists (AFEP), regained a prominent role in 
providing evidence for the indictment of General Pinochet. These groups then came to occupy 
place in the public sphere, exerting pressure on the government to enact more legislation dealing 
with past human rights abuses.  
Addressing	  human	  rights	  abuses	  in	  Chile	  	  
So what concretely was done to address human rights abuses under Pinochet’s military rule? 
One of the earliest measures after Pinochet’s arrest was the establishment of the Dialogue 
Round Table, forcing former military personnel, religious leaders and human rights groups to sit 
around the same table. Despite criticism about the political motives for fomenting the dialogue, 
it lead to the appointment by the Supreme Court of 60 special judges to investigate human rights 
cases.  
Another important initiative under the government of Ricardo Lagos, was the creation of a 
second truth commission, the Valech Commission, which between 2003 and 2004 had the task 
of investigating political imprisonment and torture. In contrast to the first truth-telling initiative 
of the early nineties, the Valech Commission was instructed to identify the survivors of the 
military dictatorship, as well as methods and torture chambers, as opposed to just the dead or 
disappeared. The Commission did not altogether abandon the cautious approach of the Rettig 
Commission; testimonies are protected by a law of secrecy, impeding their use in trials for 50 
years, and torture victims were only recognized as such when they had suffered physical abuse 
in political prisons, rather than in homes or temporary detention centres. But despite its 
limitations, the Commission identified more than 28,000 victims of the military dictatorship, 
including children, the elderly and women. 
Efforts to account for the past continued under subsequent governments, showing that 
politically the Pinochet effect was not just a short-term attempt by the Chilean government to 
satisfy spectators abroad, but that is has become part of a new obligation by the Chilean 
executive branch to confront human rights abuses. Reparation measures of the last decade have 
included the passing of legislation of symbolic and economic value and the edification of sites 
of remembrance. Two initiatives of note were the opening of the National Institute for Human 
Rights in 2010 and the inauguration of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago 
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de Chile, under Michelle Bachelet’s first presidency in 2010. The fact that that among those to 
make official visits to the Museum are not only those political figures who have always declared 
themselves against the military dictatorship, but also right-wing politicians such as President 
Sebastián Piñeda is revealing of a new political climate. As human rights lawyer Roberto 
Garretón pointed out, this museum has provided a vital collective space for remembrance: 
 
The point is that when reconciliation is talked about, two sets of actors are mentioned, not 
three. The first actor is the State, the second set of actors are the victimisers, and the third 
actor, the victims. This museum is a step in the positive direction for the reconciliation 
between the Chilean State and the victims (Garretón 2010). 
 
This shift has also been notable in the judiciary branch. Judges were a set of actors 
empowered by the Pinochet proceedings both at a domestic and international level. According 
to Kathryn Sikkink and Ellen Lutz (2001), processes of transitional prosecutions are not the 
result of a natural evolution of international criminal law. Rather, they are the product of 
individual figures, judges and human rights lawyers, the so-called “norm entrepreneurs” who 
push the boundaries. Arguments that had fallen on death ears in the 1980s, such as the non-
applicability of the amnesty to victims classified as “disappeared”, were suddenly heard in a 
new light, leading to an increase in cases. In Spain, Judge Garzón proved to be one such “norm 
entrepreneur” and in Chile, Judge Guzmán was important in testing the limits. Guzmán was the 
first to file a petition to have Pinochet’s immunity lifted on 3 March 2000, the same day that the 
General returned to Chile. Many were sceptical both within and outside Chile about breaking 
Pinochet’s shield of impunity. But this scepticism was initially dispelled, however, as on 8 
August 2000, with a vote of 14 to 6, the Supreme Court stripped Pinochet of his immunity, and 
a couple of months later he was formerly indicted on the charge of participation in 18 
kidnappings in the Caravan of Death case. He would be stripped of his immunity a further six 
times between 2000 and 2006, but legal proceedings suffered a roller coaster ride over the next 
few years, as he was released on several occasions on the grounds of ill health. Added to the 
various human rights cases, he was indicted in 2005 for embezzlement after a U.S. Senate 
inquiry revealed that he had offshore accounts with Riggs Bank containing at least $27 million. 
This was a huge political blow, as his supporters found it increasingly hard to defend a corrupt 
man. Table 2 shows a timeline of the most important cases brought against Chile including 
indictment for his role in the Caravan of Death and Operation Condor. He would never stand 
trial by the time of his death on 10 December 2006, but there is no doubt that his image had 
been seriously discredited by this time.  
Similarly, prosecutions for key figures of the military regime have been a stop-go process 
wielding mixed successes. There have been important convictions such as that of Manuel 
Contreras, the ex-head of the secret police DINA, in 2006, the conviction of eight ex-military 
figures for their role in the murder of fourteen detainees in 1973 in the Caravan of Death case in 
2013. But a Human Rights Observatory at the University of Diego Portales (2014) highlights 
the reverses in matters of human rights prosecutions between 1990 and 2014, which are in large 
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part due to the lack of consistency regarding the interpretation of Chilean law. One of the major 
obstacles to cementing accountability are the sharp differences in the Supreme Court on statutes 
of limitations and on the application of international law principles. The lack of consensus on 
these legal questions means that the verdict is dependent on the composition of the court on the 
day, the upshot being an unpredictable distribution of justice, which creates extreme frustration 
amongst the victims. Faced with these conditions, several victims have chosen to appeal their 
case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for Chile’s failure to investigate and to make 
reparation of various acts of torture. 
 
Table	  2:	  Justice	  at	  home:	  Proceedings	  against	  Pinochet	  in	  Chile	  (2000-­‐2006)	  
 
Source:	  Author’s	  own	  elaboration	  
 
Obstacles remain on the political front too. The greatest sore is the 1978 amnesty law, which 
has not been overturned despite campaign promises to do so during President Michelle 
Bachelet’s election campaign. The failure to do so is a reflection of the sensitivity of human 
rights issues in Chile which continue to this day. The Pinochet proceedings in Europe impacted 
on perceptions on Pinochet’s dictatorship, but there are still very visible fractures from the 
period of the military dictatorship, which are played out along political lines. 
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PART	  III.	  Global	  impact	  of	  the	  proceedings	  
Reactions	  abroad	  
And what can be said of the impact of the Pinochet proceedings on global political life? The 
Pinochet case clearly captured the public’s imagination across the world in 1998. Chile had for 
long time been of interest to Europeans due to its democratic traditions which resembled 
Europe’s political spectrum, with a clearly defined left and right, as opposed to other Latin 
American countries with a stronger populist tradition. There had been general shock when 
Pinochet, with Chile’s long-standing tradition of democracy, ousted a democratically elected 
leader in a most brutal way. Added to this, many Chileans, often well educated and resourceful, 
had fled to Europe during the military dictatorship, and had tried to keep the issue in the public 
eye. All these factors meant that when Pinochet was arrested in October 1996, public opinion 
was mobilized fairly quickly. Chilean exiles, but also British supporters, took part in anti-
Pinochet demonstrations, whilst others back pro-Pinochet marches. The media got fully on 
board, perhaps because there were few other gripping stories to report around that time, and the 
events of the drama were well documented in public broadcasts. For the first time in British 
history, a Law Lords’ decision was broadcast on live television. Public identification with the 
cause meant that whilst Jack Straw was issuing his final decision regarding the release of 
general Pinochet, more than 70,000 letters and e-mails had been sent to the Home Secretary.  
Similarly to what occurred at a national level, the Pinochet proceedings empowered victims 
across the world to initiate lawsuits against human rights abusers. As scholar Todd Landman 
(2013) points out, transnational prosecutions provided “political leverage and the language of 
rights for advocates and victims groups to mobilise and seek accountability for offenders around 
the world.” Victims mobilized and began to look for alternatives of justice beyond their own 
borders, many following the Pinochet path of transnational persecutions. The structural 
characteristics of transnational prosecutions, which rely heavily on testimonies and the 
gathering of evidence from victims, as opposed to a “top-down” strategy from prosecutors, have 
given survivors a renewed importance in the fight for justice. In particular, several cases 
brought before Spanish, Dutch and Belgium courts at the end of the 1990s seemed to have been 
a direct result of the Pinochet case; those of Hissène Habré of Chad, Désiré Bouterese of 
Suriname, Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Efraín Ríos 
Montt of Guatemala. In all of these instances, victims of the respective genocides or human 
rights persecutions filed cases before European courts using the principle of universal 
jurisdiction.  
In the years immediately following Pinochet’s arrest, hundreds of lawsuits were filed in 
Belgium and Spain against current and ex-head of states from Ariel Sharon and Amos Yaron to 
George H.E.W. Bush. These cases originating from civil society organisations resulted in a few 
landmark sentences, such as that of Adolfo Scilingo, the ex-Argentine chief of the navy, who in 
2005 was convicted in Spain to 640 years imprisonment for crimes against humanity. But it 
soon became clear that the Pinochet precedent had not opened the way for easy extraterritorial 
justice across the globe. On the contrary, national courts in Europe became wary that the 
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decision to press on with the application of universal jurisdiction in the case of Pinochet could 
potentially lead to an avalanche of requests from across the world.  
This had resulted in boundaries being placed on the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The 
tightening up of the laws relating to universal jurisdiction has occurred most notably in Spain 
and Belgium, two of the countries which had the most favourable jurisdiction in applying 
international criminal law; both have imposed greater conditionality on the application of 
universal jurisdiction, in effect linking the principle to nationals or residents, and by abolishing 
the possibility of an appeal in the cases which have been dismissed. The United States exerted 
much pressure on Belgium to repeal the Universal Jurisdiction Law in 2003, with U.S. Defence 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld threatening to pull NATO headquarters out of Belgium if such a 
move was not made. Likewise, Spain placed new boundaries on universal jurisdiction in both 
2009 and 2014 after diplomatic pressure was exerted by Israel, China and the United States to 
reduce the scope of its laws. The second reform came shortly after Spanish authorities released 
an arrest warrant in November 2013 against five Chinese officials stood accused on 
participating in genocide against the Tibetan people. The upshot of these reforms is the virtual 
removal of universal jurisdiction from the Spanish legal system (Alija 2014), and in this way 
justice has been traded to avoid political and diplomatic conflict to the detriment of victims of 
heinous crimes.  
Conclusion	  
If measured by the delivery of a final sentence, the case of Augusto Pinochet would seem 
like an abysmal failure. The General died peacefully in his home in 2006, having being neither 
convicted by European or Chilean courts. The conclusion to his life most certainly spelled bitter 
disappointment for the victims of the military years. But the proceedings against Augusto 
Pinochet achieved what few other international criminal trials have: the discrediting of 
Pinochet’s name and the setting in motion of a new phase of transitional politics in Chile.  
The Pinochet proceedings have propelled a new approach in dealing with the military 
dictatorship in Chile. Whereas in the years immediately following Pinochet’s relinquishing of 
power, the demands of individual victims were traded for a greater project of reconstructing of a 
stable democracy, this absolute trade-off is not longer deemed satisfactory, nor in fact 
successful in healing the wounds of the past following the return of Pinochet to Chile. The 
Pinochet case had the effect of accelerating a new stage in transitional politics in Chile in which 
there was a notable shift in notions of individual criminal responsibility and a new relationship 
between the State, the judiciary branch and the victims of the military dictatorship. Successive 
governments have been forced to adopt a more extensive human rights agenda with and have 
multiplied the number of symbolic and economic reparation measures. In parallel, the judiciary 
branch has been more willing to prosecute although justice remains unpredictable and partial 
with victims continuing to look towards European and inter-regional courts in the absence of 
favourable verdicts in Chile. These changes were the result were propelled from bottom-up, by 
civil society along with judges determined to challenge the status quo of impunity which had 
dominated in Chile during her transition to democracy. 
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At a global level, the case of Augusto Pinochet constituted a pioneering example. Victims, 
with the support of NGOs and lawyers, defied the Chilean state and territorial confines by 
bringing their case against Augusto Pinochet to a global audience. This in turn empowered 
victims all over the world, from Guatemala to Chad, to challenge the impunity of perpetrators of 
human rights in foreign courts. But despite the possibilities that universal jurisdiction seemed to 
be offering at the turn of the century, its scope has been somewhat limited with few foreign 
leaders actually tried in domestic courts. Does this mean that universal jurisdiction’s brief hay 
day already come to a close? Although universal jurisdiction has not yet become an obsolete 
tool, it is clear that the globe’s most powerful countries- including both the United States and 
China- have exerted strong diplomatic pressure on realising the damaging implications that 
these international laws could have for their own politicians. The courts most likely to try non 
domestic cases of crimes against humanity such as Spain and Belgium have restricted their laws 
on universal jurisdiction, thus showing reluctance to become global courts open to hearing 
human rights cases from victims around the world. Faced with this reality, therefore, the 
possibilities of universal jurisdiction becoming a widespread tool for victims around the globe 
to gain justice are limited. 
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